Abstract: This paper introduces the distortion of resource market into the “resource curse” hypothesis, discusses the proposition of “how resource abundance leads to resource dependence” from the perspective of “Chinese decentralization” and its promotion incentive, and empirically tests it based on the 2009-2016 provincial panel data of China.The results show that: the distorted level of resource market regulates the relationship between resource abundance and resource dependence, which is an important condition for resource dependence; the promotion system arrangement in the form of championship and the promotion assessment standard in the form of economic performance are important motives for local governments to distort resource market; the distorted resource market in the areas with abundant resources helps to stimulate the short-term economic growth and officials′ political achievements will hinder growth in the long run and produce a “Curse” effect. Therefore, the distortion of incentive design in government governance is the root cause of China′s “resource curse”.

Key words: market distortion, resource dependence, resource curse, grabbing hand