Abstract: Executive equity incentive is an indispensable mechanism to eliminate the agency problem, and the effect of executive stock ownership on the promotion of R&D investment(interest cooperation) is regarded as an important way to keep the competitive advantage of enterprises. This paper chooses the special situation of executive cash, and observes the effect of the investment catering on interest cooperation effect from static and dynamic double visual angle. The conclusion is that the increase of R&D investment in listed corporation which executives cashed is the result of the effect of investment catering and the interest cooperation, and there is a certain complementary relationship between the two effects. It is worth noting that, under the situation of executives′ cashing behavior, enhanced synergy of interests led to the inefficient investment of enterprises. Therefore, enterprise should not ignore the influence of executive self motivation on R&D investment activities in the implementation of equity incentive mechanism.

Key words: catering investment, interest cooperation, executive stock ownership, enterprise R&D investment, gem