Heterogeneous Institutional Investors,Enterprise Policy and Enterprise Risk

Abstract

Abstract: Institutional investors play an important role in stabilizing the capital market and participating in the governance of listed companies.Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016, this paper examines the impact of heterogeneous institutional investors on corporate risk.The study finds that stable institutional investors participate in corporate governance by influencing corporate risk policies, thereby reducing corporate risk;in enterprises with low quality of internal control and state-owned property rights, the negative correlation between stable institutional investors and corporate risk is stronger. Therefore, the heterogeneity of institutional investors is an important factor for them to exert their governance effect. Enterprises should pay full attention to the role of stable institutional investors when improving the governance structure.

Key words: institutional investors, enterprise risk, enterprise policy；property right nature

ZHANG Chang-hai, LI Kai-qing,ZENG Chun-hua. Heterogeneous Institutional Investors,Enterprise Policy and Enterprise Risk[J]. 商业研究.

References

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