Abstract: As the informal institutional arrangement, the board interlocks is an important channel to obtain heterogeneous information and scarce resources for enterprises. Based on the perspective of social network relations, this paper constructs the board network centrality at the company level, and investigates the mechanism of board interlocks on managerial power and stickiness of executive compensation. The results show that there is positive correlation between managerial power and stickiness of executive compensation, and the board network centrality has a significantly negative regulation effect weakening the relation between them. After distinguishing the interlocks strength, further research finds that the internal and external board interlocks relations have differentiated impact on the governance effect, and stronger interlocks relations from internal directors need to be vigilant, which the positive regulation effect would increase stickiness of executive compensation. The above findings mean that network location and interlocks strength are the two key factors influencing the governance effect of board interlocks, and the network location will have an important governance mechanism for managerial power and compensation stickiness, but its role depends on the strength of internal and external board interlocks relations.

Key words: managerial power, stickiness of executive compensation, board interlocks, network centrality, interlocks strength