Abstract: R&D innovation has become an important source of core competitiveness of enterprises, but why R&D outsourcing is not as common as manufacturing outsourcing?From the perspective of incomplete contract theory, the strong incompleteness of R&D outsourcing contract is one of the main reasons for the development constraints of R&D outsourcing, and the efficiency of technology transfer after the event is an important aspect affecting the efficiency of R&D outsourcing contract.Therefore, how to avoid the parties ripping off each other after the event is the key to improve the efficiency of technology transfer after the event. The mechanism and influence of bamboo poaching are analyzed by establishing a mathematical model of technology transfer after the event. It is considered that the technology licensing fee and the way of property rights allocation determined beforehand in R&D outsourcing contract are the key factors to determine whether the bamboo poaching occurs after the event and the size of the impact after the event.Among them, the setting of technology licensing fee has two modes: fixed price and flexible price, namely rigid contract and flexible contract. Through analysis, signing flexible contract beforehand can relatively improve the efficiency of technology transfer afterwards; in the property right arrangement, the intellectual property right of the principal owning innovative technology can reduce the opportunism afterwards. The probability of being.

Key words: incomplete contract, R&D outsourcing, technology transfer, holdup