Abstract: How to improve the accounting information quality of dual-class share companies is the focus of our regulatory authorities on emerging dual-class share companies.Based on the sample of dual-class share structure companies in the United States from 2010 to 2018, this paper discusses the effects that the internal and external shareholders′ separation of cash flow rights from voting rights on accounting information quality.It is found that the active separation of cash flow rights from voting rights of shareholders with high control rights in dual-class share structure companies would indeed reduce accounting information quality, although institutional investors have passive separation of two rights, they can also alleviate the negative impact of dual-class share on accounting information quality, and the effect of cash flow rights is better than that of voting rights;the cash flow rights and higher proportion of voting rights of institutional investors with independent interests and relatively long holding time can more effectively alleviate the negative impact of the separation of two rights on accounting information quality.

Key words: dual-class share structure, separation of cash flow rights from voting rights, accounting information quality, institutional investors