Abstract: Taking the senior managers of A-share listed companies in Shanghai stock market from 2000 to 2018 as the research sample, this paper uses the theory of social capital as the research basis, and uses the investment-cash flow sensitivity model to test the influence of CEO moral hazard on corporate financing constraints in various situations. The empirical results show that CEO moral hazard has a negative effect on enterprise financing:the higher the CEO moral hazard is, the more difficult it is for the enterprise to obtain financing; in the case of the combination of CEO and chairman, the CEO moral hazard problem is still high;when the CEO′s power is balanced, moral hazard decreases and financing constraints are eased. This paper not only gives the quantitative expression of moral hazard and deepens the financing constraint theory, but also combines the social capital theory to provide a new explanation on how the senior managers affect the financing constraints of enterprises, and provides new enlightenment to how to strengthen the governance of listed companies and crack the financing constraints.

Key words: CEO, moral hazard, financing constraints, social capital theory