IPO Overfunding and R&D Investment Smoothness: Resistance or Assistance?

Abstract

Abstract: The stability of R&D investment is closely related to the persistence of enterprises′ competitive advantages. This paper takes the IPO overfunding phenomenon in GEM market as the breakthrough point, and uses the relevant data of GEM IPO companies in 2009-2018 to empirically analyze the impact mechanism of IPO overfunding on R&D smoothness and the product market competition effect.The results show that: GEM listed companies have R&D smoothing behavior, and IPO overfunding have a significant inhibitory effect on R&D smoothing; improving internal corporate governance and investor legal protection system can weaken the inhibition effect of IPO overfunding on R&D smoothing; IPO overfunding may inhibit the R&D smoothing behavior by inducing agency conflicts and performance decline; IPO overfunding will inhibit the product market competition effect of R&D smoothing, and this phenomenon is more significant in high smooth enterprises.

Key words: IPO overfunding, R&D investment smoothing, corporate governance, investors protection, product market competition performance

XU Hui1,2,ZHOU Bing1,2,ZHOU Xiao-hua3. IPO Overfunding and R&D Investment Smoothness: Resistance or Assistance?[J]. 商业研究.

References

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