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Executive Power, Ownership Structure and Budgetary Slack

AN Ling, SHEN Qing-qing, SUN Guang-hui
  

  1. School of Accountancy, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China
  • Received:2016-05-25 Online:2016-10-10

Abstract:

Budgetary slack is an important point of enterprise budget management and corporate governance, which is not only an important means of financial control of enterprise, but also an important strategic tool of enterprise executive positions entrenchment effect. Based on the panel data model, the paper empirically studied the impact of executive power of listed corporation in China on budgetary slack. Research showed that China′s listed corporation budgetary slack significantly affected the executive power: the larger executive power, the higher possibility of budgetary slack; the proportion of the first shareholders has a positively linear relationship with budgetary slack, and the different ultimate property rights influence budgetary slack significantly; compared with the non- state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises have greater possibility of budgetary slack, and the impact of executive power on budget slack is more obvious.

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