Analyst Attention, Corporate Growth and Violations of Listed Company

Abstract

Abstract: As an external governance mechanism of capital market, what′s the role of analyst attention? Using data of Chinese listed companies in 2003-2014, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between analyst attention and violations of company, and how corporate growth influences the aforementioned relationship. This study finds analyst attention can reduce violations of company, and corporate growth can weaken this effect; after distinguishing audit quality, it is found that analyst attention does not significantly affect violations in the environment of high audit quality, but it significantly reduced violations in the environment of low audit quality, indicating that analyst attention can play a role of alternative mechanism to independent audit; when governance level of institutional investor is higher or in the environment that CEO and chairman are not the same person, the restriction effect of analyst attention on violations is more significant.

Key words: analyst attention, corporate growth, violations of listed company

XIAO Qi1, SHEN Hua-yu2. Analyst Attention, Corporate Growth and Violations of Listed Company[J]. 商业研究.

References

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