Abstract: The article divides corporate environmental crime behavior into unlicensed facility, improper operation and excessive emission with time logic, and analyzes the governance utility differences between constrained and incentive regulations, and the suppression effect on different types of environmental crimes of enterprises by subdividing district. Results show in the whole sample, the restraining effect of restraint regulation on excessive emission is not obvious, in incentive regulation, tax incentives inhibit excessive emissions, environmental subsidies inhibited improper operation but drove excessive emissions. Grouped by region, the effectiveness of the constrained regulation in the western region is relatively obvious, constrained environmental law enforcement has curbed excessive emissions in the western region, corruption will have a negative impact on the emission reduction effects of constrained environmental regulations; incentive regulation effectiveness in the eastern region is relatively significant, tax incentives in incentive regulation have spurred improper operation in the eastern region, suppressed excessive emissions, environmental subsidies inhibit improper operations in the eastern region, increased emissions exceeding,public environmental letters and visits have a positive impact on the credit reduction efficiency of credit preferences. The research results show that the existing environmental regulation management policy should be further refined, considering the regulatory effects corresponding to different regulatory measures, and make necessary adjustments in the focus in different regions.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, environmental regulation intensity, environmental crime behavior, regional corruption, public participation