商业研究

商业研究

• 经营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

行业变更是急功近利还是高瞻远瞩？ ——基于“损失规避”假说和管理者私利的分析

梅波1,2   

  1. 1.重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院，重庆 400074； 2.南京大学 会计与财务研究院，南京 210093
  • 收稿日期:2017-04-07 出版日期:2017-10-10
  • 作者简介:梅波（1980-），男，重庆长寿人，重庆交通大学经济与管理学院副教授，会计学博士，研究方向：产业组织与公司财务。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金一般项目“宏观经济政策、公司治理对企业创新的影响研究”，项目编号：71372029；教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“复杂环境下厘清多周期叠加的债务资源错配机理及风险防控机制研究”，项目编号：17YJC790108；重庆市社会科学规划项目“经济周期、行业与企业生命周期联动下的债务融资决策研究”，项目编号：2015BS022；重庆市教育委员会人文社科重点研究基地项目“经济新常态下融资模式创新驱动重庆市产业发展的路径研究”，项目编号：16SKJD19。

Is Industry Change Quick Success or Foresight? An Analysis based on “Loss Aversion” Hypothesis of Prospect Theory and Manager′s Self-interest

MEI Bo1,2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074,China；2. Research Institute of Accounting and Finance, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China)
  • Received:2017-04-07 Online:2017-10-10

摘要： 基于前景理论的“损失规避”假说和管理者私利，本文考察公司行业变更行为的动机和经济后果。研究表明公司行业变更一般短期绩效较明显，而长期绩效不明显，说明目前我国公司行业变更行为中存在一定程度的急功近利动机，而这不仅与企业经营决策的科学性有关，也与公司的性质、管理层的激励方式有关。具体表现为：行业变更后短期业绩更好，而研发费用投入与长期业绩效应不明显。相比于非国有企业，国有企业行业变更的短期业绩效应更明显，而其长期业绩不明显；非中央控制国企行业变更的短期业绩效应更明显，而中央控制国企行业变更的短期业绩效应不明显。相比市场化程度较高地区，市场化较低地区行业变更的短期业绩效应高于长期业绩效应。进一步分析发现：股权分置改革之前较之后，行业变更后的短期业绩更好；管理者薪酬较低组中行业变更有助于短期业绩的改善，而在管理者薪酬较高组中行业变更后长期业绩改善更多，其更注重长期价值提升。

关键词: 公司行业变更, 业绩划分, 前景理论, 管理者私利, 急功近利

Abstract: The paper explains the motivation and economic consequences of industry change behavior based on “loss aversion” hypothesis of prospect theory and manager′s self-interest motivation. Research shows short-term performance of industry changes is obvious, but the long-term performance is not obvious, indicating a certain degree of success motivation exists at present in industry change of our country, and this not only is related to the scientific nature of enterprise management decisions, but also is related to the nature of the company and management incentives: short-term performance is better after the industry change, but R&D investment and long-term performance effect is not obvious; compared to non-state-owned enterprise, short-term performance effect of state-owned enterprise changes is more obvious, and its long-term performance is not obvious. Short-term performance effect of non-central control state-owned enterprise is more obvious, and its long-term performance is not obvious; compared to higher degree of market area, short-term performance of lower market area is more obvious, and long-term performance effect is not obvious. Further analysis finds: short-term performance effect of industry change is more obvious before the Share Merger Reform; industry change improves short-term performance in lower-paid manager group, but long-term performance which means long value after the industry change is better in higher-paid manager group.

Key words: industry change, performance division, prospect theory, manager′s self-interest, quick success