An Analysis of Associated Guarantee and Corporate Cost of Debt: Mechanism
Test based on Information Risk and Debt Agency Risk
ZHANG Jun-min1, LI Hui-yun1,2, SONG Jie1
(1. School of Accounting, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222,China;2.Department of Accounting, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics Pearl River College, Tianjin 301811,China)
ZHANG Jun-min1, LI Hui-yun1,2, SONG Jie1. An Analysis of Associated Guarantee and Corporate Cost of Debt: Mechanism
Test based on Information Risk and Debt Agency Risk[J]. 商业研究.
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