Abstract: As a governance contract with double effects, is good executive reputation a driving force for technological innovation or the shackles of innovation? The paper uses the moderating path analytic technique put forward by Edwards and Lambert to test the non-linear relationship between executive reputation and R&D investment and the mediating effect of executive compensation, by using the balanced panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016. The research shows that there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between senior management reputation and R&D investment, that is, the executives reputation will have a positive impact on R&D investment before executive reputation reaches the optimal level, but exceeding this optimum level, it will evolve into negative influence; executive reputation has an obvious effect on executive compensation by inverted U-curve effect, which in turn promotes the inverted U-type relationship between executive reputation and R&D investment, that is, executive compensation plays an intermediary role in the relationship between executive reputation and R&D investment.

Key words: executive reputation, executive compensation, R&D investment, non-linear relationship, path analysis